An institutionalist view holds alliances survive only while states value their benefits.

Evidence

Finally, in clear contrast to an organizational perspective, it would not be outside of the realm of institutionalist theory for NATO member states to conclude that NATO, or various parts and functions, had served its function and was no longer needed. We need not predict that NATO will die—the international institutionalist perspective is silent in this regard; what we do predict is that when member states no longer value what the alliance does, little will prevent those wishes from resulting in the alliance’s death. The demise of NATO’s nuclear infrastructure illustrates this scenario: a powerful organizational actor has been weakened because it served the broader needs of NATO members to do so. The organization and the alliance per se are not the critical issue here—the benefits that come from each are. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 133

Categorization

• XREF: The core institutionalist- vs-organizational explanation for NATO’s persistence bears directly on the reader’s question of why NATO outlived its founding enemy; the nuclear-infrastructure example offers an empirical test of the mechanism. — connects to: Both realism and institutionalism ignore the domestic prerequisites of alliance costs — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 139; Threat-based alliance logic holds only for non-institutionalized arrangements. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 157; Deeply institutionalized alliances outlast ad hoc ones against realist expectations — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 161 (+9 more)

Broader Connections

• alliance persistence requires domestic political support that international relations theories overlook #expands (0.90) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 139
• Alliance theory predicts collapse once threats vanish. #expands (0.88) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 14
• Deeply institutionalized alliances outlast ad hoc ones against realist expectations #contradicts (0.82) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 161
• An alliance persists when its founding enemy vanishes. #exemplifies (0.80) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 57
• Realism explains alliance behavior under threat but fails without one. #qualifies (0.79) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 157
• Both realism and institutionalism ignore the domestic prerequisites of alliance costs #complicates (0.78) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 139
• A cease-fire holds only while its sponsoring core state retains strategic interest. #exemplifies (0.77) — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 809
• Norms can sustain regimes only while elites can plausibly invoke shared commitments #expands (0.76) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 47
• Threat-based alliance logic holds only for non-institutionalized arrangements. #qualifies (0.75) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 157
• A shared enemy cannot hold alliance partners whose ambitions conflict #qualifies (0.74) — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 881
• Cooperation in institutions emerges from structured alternatives, not free consent. #complicates (0.73) — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 849
• A revolutionary government endures only if it unites a majority coalition. #exemplifies (0.72) — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 2173