Deeply institutionalized alliances outlast ad hoc ones against realist expectations

Evidence

While NATO’s high degree of organizational and institutional development sets it off from other alliances, increasing political and economic integration suggest that future security efforts by states will be more multilateral in nature and show greater institutional development than in the past. To the degree that the security needs of increasingly interdependent states are seen in a broad, multilevel perspective that encompasses political, economic, social, and domestic dimensions, alliances like NATO are likely to endure, especially as publics are increasingly unwilling to support unilateral security measures where the costs cannot be spread. Those that are simply ad hoc cooperative security arrangements are likely to exhibit the sensitivity to shifts in threat perceptions and power balances that realist theories expect. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 161

Categorization

• XREF: Ties directly to reader’s interest in institutions persisting after founding enemies disappear — the institutionalist vs. realist fork. — connects to: Explaining alliance persistence requires nonrealist unit-level theory. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 16; All realists hold that external threats are necessary for alliances to form and persist — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 33; Neorealism cannot explain alliance persistence once threats vanish. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 61 (+10 more)

Broader Connections

• Neorealist theories predict alliances collapse once their external threat fades. #responds-to (0.92) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 37
• Alliance theory predicts collapse once threats vanish. #responds-to (0.92) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 14
• Alliance cohesion rises and falls with the external threat it balances #contradicts (0.90) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 36
• Alliance theory has neglected why alliances persist and what happens when they become obsolete #expands (0.85) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 31
• Both realism and institutionalism ignore the domestic prerequisites of alliance costs #complicates (0.78) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 139
• A shared enemy cannot hold alliance partners whose ambitions conflict #qualifies (0.73) — Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the…, 881
• Alliances can serve as devices for surrendering freedom of choice #qualifies (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 712