Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic

Evidence

The usual idea that a trip wire either does work or does not work, that the Russians either expect it to work or expect it not to work, is mistaking two simple extremes for a more complicated range of probabilities. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 460

Categorization

• XREF: The graduated-probability view of deterrence mirrors the reader’s mapping of Schelling onto a bargaining continuum — and the same binary-versus-graded fallacy recurs in how the mafia’s enforcement credibility is (mis)read as all-or-nothing rather than probabilistic. — connects to: Deterrence can operate as an unintended byproduct of other actions — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 422; Deterrence can be built as graduated probabilistic trip wires rather than a single switch. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 429; Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 30 (+7 more)

Related

• Deterrence can be built as graduated probabilistic trip wires rather than a single switch. (similarity 0.85)
• Deterrence rests on surviving retaliation capacity, not on existing destructive capacity. (similarity 0.85)
• Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. (similarity 0.83)
• Stability of mutual-deterrence equilibria depends on the slopes of each side’s response functions (similarity 0.81)
• Deterrence can operate as an unintended byproduct of other actions (similarity 0.81)
• Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly (similarity 0.80)
• Rational actors need not calculate beyond first-order attack likelihoods. (similarity 0.80)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.79)
• A perfectly stable balance of deterrence may not even be desirable, let alone achievable. (similarity 0.79)
• Mutually invulnerable retaliation forces neutralize each other’s deterrent role (similarity 0.78)
• Deterrence requires mixed conflict and common interest between parties (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Stability of mutual-deterrence equilibria depends on the slopes of each side’s response functions #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 502
• Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly #complicates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 30
• Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. #corroborates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 529