Deterrence can operate as an unintended byproduct of other actions

Evidence

The threat—if we call this contingent-behavior mechanism a “threat”—has some interesting features. It may exist whether we realize it or not. Even those who have doubted whether our massive-retaliation threat was a potent deterrent to minor aggression during the last several years, but are perplexed that the Russians have not engaged in more mischief than they have, can note that the threat we voiced was backed by an additional implicit threat that we might be triggered by Soviet actions in spite of ourselves. Furthermore, even if we prefer not to incur even a small probability of inadvertent war, and would not use this mechanism deliberately, the “threat” in question may be a byproduct of other actions that we have a powerful incentive to take. We may get this threat whether we like it or not when we (and the Russians) take precautions commensurate with a crisis; knowing this, the Russians may have to take the risk into account. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 422

Categorization

• SEED: A potentially strong essay angle: credibility that accrues without intent — whether in geopolitics, organized crime, or organizational behavior — as a general theory of commitment-by-product.
• XREF: connects to: Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 460; Deliberate action requires partial but not total foresight of consequences — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 785; Political action under urgency is a form of bluffing about outcomes — Christine Daigle, Jacob Golomb (eds.), Beauvoir and Sartre: The Riddle of…, 490 (+2 more)

Related

• Unforeseeable escalation risk alone can deter aggression even among cautious rational actors. (similarity 0.82)
• Refusing to prepare for limited war can be a deliberate deterrent strategy (similarity 0.81)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.81)
• Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic (similarity 0.81)
• Deterrence rests on surviving retaliation capacity, not on existing destructive capacity. (similarity 0.79)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 460
• Deliberate action requires partial but not total foresight of consequences #expands (0.75) — Georg Simmel, on individuality and social forms_…, 785