Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games.

Evidence

What should we add to the game to enrich it if the assumption of symmetry is dropped? There are many “moves” that are often available, but not necessarily equally available to both players, in actual game situation. “Moves” would include commitments, threats, promises; tampering with the communication system; invocation of penalties on promises, commitments, and threats; conveyance of true information, self-identification; and the injection of contextual detail that may constrain expectations, particularly when communication is incomplete. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 635

Categorization

• DEFINE: Catalogues the full arsenal of non-symmetric ‘moves’ available in actual bargaining: commitments, threats, promises, communication tampering, self-identification.
• XREF: connects to: Perfect move symmetry neutralizes all interesting bargaining moves in advance. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 634; Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 641; Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289 (+3 more)

Related

• Perfect move symmetry neutralizes all interesting bargaining moves in advance. (similarity 0.88)
• Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. (similarity 0.85)
• Non-symmetry beats both committed symmetry and committed asymmetry. (similarity 0.81)
• Moves reveal value systems and commit players where speech cannot (similarity 0.80)
• Binding-agreement machinery becomes irrelevant under perfect symmetry (similarity 0.79)
• Threats and promises are meaningless in zero-sum games (similarity 0.79)
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. #corroborates (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 641
• Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game #exemplifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289