Linking two separate negotiations can enable threats impossible within a single game.

Evidence

But suppose the two games are simultaneously up for decision, and the same two parties are involved in both. If either party can commit himself to a threat he may improve his position. East, for example, could threaten to choose β rather than B in game 6, unless North chose A rather than α in game 5; alternatively, North could threaten α in game 6 unless East chose β in game 5. Assuming the intervals large enough in game 6, and the threat persuasively committed and communicated, the threatener gains in game 5 at no cost in game 6. Because his threat succeeds he does not carry it out; so he gets AB in 6 as well as his preferred choice in game 5. To express this result differently, game 6 supplies what was ruled out earlier, namely, the threat of an act “outside the game.” From the point of view of game 5, game 6 is an extraneous act, and East might as well threaten to burn North’s house down if he does not choose A in 5. But such purely extortionate threats are not always easy to make; they often require an occasion, an object, and a means of communication, and additionally often suffer from illegality, immorality, or resistance out of sheer stubbornness. The joining of two negotiations on the same agenda may thus succeed where a purely gratuitous threat would be impracticable. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 128

Categorization

• XREF: Directly parallels Gambetta’s account of how the Mafia leverages collateral commitments and hostage-keeping across separate transactions, and Milgrom et al.’s linkage of reputation across repeated dealings. — connects to: Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 299
• ADDENDUM: Supports the ‘On Sacrifice’ theme: an extraneous costly act on another game is precisely how the Godfather’s willingness to harm himself or others across separate arenas underwrites credibility.

Related

• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.83)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game #complicates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 299