Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain.

Evidence

But if we can threaten him with a one-in-twenty chance of all-out war in the event he proceeds, and he does proceed, we can hold our breath and have nineteen-to-one odds of getting off without general war. Of course, if we scale down the risk to us, we scale it down to him too; it may degrade the threat to put too much safety in it. But in cases where there is danger that we completely misjudge the enemy’s commitment to an action, or completely misjudge his ability to control his own agents, allies, or commanders, the more moderate risk may deter anything that is still within his control. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 427

Categorization

• XREF: The safety-versus-bite tradeoff of a threat; parallels how a partial hostage or partial commitment can deter while a full one creates a credibility problem. — connects to: A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 416; A probabilistic threat stays credible despite failures because one trial proves little — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 422; Limited war deters partly by exposing both sides to uncontrollable risk of escalation — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 425 (+10 more)

Related

• Small-probability threats are superior to large certain threats in compellence (similarity 0.90)
• Limited war deters partly by exposing both sides to uncontrollable risk of escalation (similarity 0.86)
• A credible threat can subordinate the final decision to chance outside the threatener’s control (similarity 0.86)
• Unforeseeable escalation risk alone can deter aggression even among cautious rational actors. (similarity 0.84)
• A deterrent threat is only credible if control over its triggering is partly surrendered. (similarity 0.83)
• A credible threat works precisely because it need never be carried out. (similarity 0.82)
• A deterrent threat is only too large when its size damages credibility (similarity 0.81)
• Limited war’s main function is signaling escalation risk, not local military gain. (similarity 0.80)
• A probabilistic threat stays credible despite failures because one trial proves little (similarity 0.80)
• Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties (similarity 0.80)
• A losing side rationally abandons containment for deliberate risk-creation. (similarity 0.80)
• Refusing to prepare for limited war can be a deliberate deterrent strategy (similarity 0.79)
• Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment (similarity 0.79)
• Protection demands are credible only when they come from established sources. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Small-probability threats are superior to large certain threats in compellence #expands (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 442
• A deterrent threat is only too large when its size damages credibility #qualifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 711
• Deterrence works only when fighters can reliably predict battle outcomes #qualifies (0.80)