Limited war deters partly by exposing both sides to uncontrollable risk of escalation

Evidence

Here again is a threat that all-out war may occur, not that it certainly will occur, if the other party engages in certain actions. Again, whether it does or does not occur is not a matter altogether controlled by the threatener. Just how all-out war would occur—just where the fault, initiative, or misunderstanding may occur—is not sure. Whatever it is that makes limited war between great powers a risky thing, the risk is a genuine one that neither side can altogether dispel if it wants to. The final decision, or the critical action that initiates an irreversible process, is not something that should necessarily be expected to be taken altogether deliberately. “Chance” helps to decide whether general war occurs or not, with odds that are a matter of judgment based on the nature of the limited war and the context in which it occurs. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 425

Categorization

• XREF: The reader’s stated goal of tracing legal failure to Mafia substitution maps here: a mediator’s ability to escalate a dispute into uncontrollable vendetta replicates this limited-war risk mechanism in microcosm. — connects to: Refusing to prepare for limited war can be a deliberate deterrent strategy — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 200; Limited war’s main function is signaling escalation risk, not local military gain. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 431; Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 427 (+4 more)

Related

• Limited war’s main function is signaling escalation risk, not local military gain. (similarity 0.92)
• Refusing to prepare for limited war can be a deliberate deterrent strategy (similarity 0.87)
• Unforeseeable escalation risk alone can deter aggression even among cautious rational actors. (similarity 0.86)
• Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. (similarity 0.86)
• A losing side rationally abandons containment for deliberate risk-creation. (similarity 0.82)
• Governments can enter major wars inadvertently through imperfect decision processes (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Limited war’s main function is signaling escalation risk, not local military gain. #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 431
• Refusing to prepare for limited war can be a deliberate deterrent strategy #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 200
• Threatening a small risk beats threatening certainty when the enemy’s controllability is uncertain. #qualifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 427
• Deterrence works only when fighters can reliably predict battle outcomes #contradicts (0.78)