Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability

Evidence

What useful insight does this line of analysis provide into the practical problems of tacit bargaining that usually confront us, particularly the problems of strategic maneuver and limited war? It certainly suggests that it is possible to find limits to war—real war, jurisdictional war, or whatever—without overt negotiation. But it gives us no new strong sense of probability. War was limited in Korea, and gas was not used in World War II; on the possibility of limited war these two facts are more persuasive than all the suggestions contained in the foregoing discussion. If the analysis provides anything, then, it is not a judgment of the probability of successfully reaching tacit agreement but a better understanding of where to look for the terms of agreement. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 189

Categorization

• QUESTION: Schelling concedes the theory gives no probability sense — useful caveat separating analytical mapping from predictive confidence in the Mafia-reader’s framework.
• XREF: connects to: Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 791; Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858; Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 859 (+2 more)

Related

• Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones (similarity 0.89)
• Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations (similarity 0.86)
• Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. (similarity 0.84)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.83)
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players (similarity 0.83)
• Nuclear arms negotiations are an open-ended bargaining problem beyond fixed payoff matrices (similarity 0.83)
• Tacit bargaining forces one party to accept an unfair focal point (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.80)
• Pre-arranged communication infrastructure raises the odds tacit bargaining succeeds (similarity 0.80)
• Tacit agreements need qualitatively distinct terms that may discriminate against one party (similarity 0.80)
• Conflict settings share common-interest structures across wildly different scales (similarity 0.79)
• Conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations (similarity 0.79)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.79)
• Limits emerge through tacit jockeying and need unique focal qualities. (similarity 0.79)
• Bargaining outcomes rest on convergent reflexive expectations, not on force or merit (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 213