Pre-arranged communication infrastructure raises the odds tacit bargaining succeeds

Evidence

While the main burden of this paper has been that tacit bargaining is possible and is susceptible of systematic analysis, there is no assurance that it will succeed in any particular case or that, when it succeeds, it will yield to either party a particularly favorable outcome compared with alternatives that might have been available if full communication had been allowed. There is no assurance that the next war, if it comes, will find mutually observed limits in time and of a sort to afford protection, unless explicit negotiation can take place. There is reason, therefore, to consider what steps can be taken before the time for tacit bargaining occurs, to enhance the likelihood of a successful outcome. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 197

Categorization

• XREF: Pre-commitment to communication channels parallels Schelling’s point that ex ante institutions (arbitrators, hostage mechanics) enable later credible coordination. — connects to: Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187; Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 186; Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201

Related

• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations (similarity 0.85)
• Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones (similarity 0.80)
• Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability (similarity 0.80)
• Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations (similarity 0.79)
• Bargaining outcomes rest on convergent reflexive expectations, not on force or merit (similarity 0.79)
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201
• Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 186