Conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations
Evidence
To study the strategy of conflict is to take the view that most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations. They are situations in which the ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 21
Categorization
- XREF: The foundational framing that lets the reader cast Bonasera’s plea and the Godfather’s arbitration as tacit bargaining between parties whose mutual dependence structures the deal — and the hostage-like ‘Godfather bond’ as the commitment mechanism. — connects to: Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 213; Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289; Anger deters aggression and seeks bargaining power rather than fairness. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 661 (+3 more)
Related
- Conflict settings share common-interest structures across wildly different scales (similarity 0.84)
- Bargaining games mix positively and negatively sloped payoff pairs (similarity 0.83)
- Nuclear arms negotiations are an open-ended bargaining problem beyond fixed payoff matrices (similarity 0.82)
- Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games (similarity 0.81)
- One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.81)
- The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.80)
- Most conflicts are variable-sum games with common interests (similarity 0.80)
- Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability (similarity 0.79)
- In mutual-dependence games possessing initiative can be a disadvantage (similarity 0.79)
- Perfect move symmetry neutralizes all interesting bargaining moves in advance. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games
#expands(0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 213 - Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game
#expands(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289