Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones

Evidence

With full information about each other’s value systems and a homogeneous set of gains to be divided, there may be an infinity of equivalent solutions, all yielding the same values to the two players, but no difficulty in agreeing on an arbitrary choice among this indifferent set. But tacit bargaining often requires a further degree of coordination, namely, a coordinated choice even among equivalent divisions of the gains. Negotiation over a boundary line in homogeneous territory is thus different from the simultaneous dispatch of troops to take up positions representing claims (as in Question 6 on page 62); such claims may overlap and cause trouble even though the terrain values claimed are consistent. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 859

Categorization

• DEFINE: Clarifies that full-information bargaining can stay indifferent among equivalent outcomes while tacit bargaining must coordinate on one — a distinction central to Schelling’s framing.
• XREF: connects to: Nuclear arms negotiations are an open-ended bargaining problem beyond fixed payoff matrices — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 515; The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 668; Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 791 (+6 more)

Related

• Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability (similarity 0.89)
• Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations (similarity 0.88)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.86)
• Nuclear arms negotiations are an open-ended bargaining problem beyond fixed payoff matrices (similarity 0.86)
• Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. (similarity 0.85)
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players (similarity 0.84)
• Tacit bargaining forces one party to accept an unfair focal point (similarity 0.82)
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.80)
• Pre-arranged communication infrastructure raises the odds tacit bargaining succeeds (similarity 0.80)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences (similarity 0.79)
• Tacit agreements need qualitatively distinct terms that may discriminate against one party (similarity 0.79)
• Bargaining games mix positively and negatively sloped payoff pairs (similarity 0.79)
• Bargaining outcomes rest on convergent reflexive expectations, not on force or merit (similarity 0.79)
• Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 189
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations #corroborates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players #corroborates (0.74) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858
• Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations #corroborates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 186