Nuclear arms negotiations are an open-ended bargaining problem beyond fixed payoff matrices
Evidence
But, in general, this becomes a wide-open bargaining problem. It is even wider open than the present formulation suggests, since the players may not only manipulate values of R and B but of course can now threaten direct attack, or operate on the institutional arrangements that determine the values of the A’s. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 515
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 213; Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 859; Bargaining games mix positively and negatively sloped payoff pairs — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 215 (+1 more)
Related
- Bargaining games mix positively and negatively sloped payoff pairs (similarity 0.87)
- Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones (similarity 0.86)
- Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability (similarity 0.83)
- Conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations (similarity 0.82)
- Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games (similarity 0.81)
- The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.81)
- Conflict settings share common-interest structures across wildly different scales (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games
#expands(0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 213 - Bargaining games mix positively and negatively sloped payoff pairs
#expands(0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 215 - Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones
#qualifies(0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 859 - In focal-point bargaining small concessions signal collapse and are rejected
#exemplifies(0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 266