Tacit bargaining forces one party to accept an unfair focal point

Evidence

A conflict of interest enters our problem if the parachutists dislike walking. With communication, which is not allowed in our problem, they would have argued or bargained over where to meet, each favoring a spot close to himself or a resting place particularly to his liking. In the absence of communication, their overriding interest is to concert ideas; and if a particular spot commands attention as the “obvious” place to meet, the winner of the bargain is simply the one who happens to be closer to it. Even if the one who is farthest from the focal point knows that he is, he cannot withhold his acquiescence and argue for a fairer division of the walking; the “proposal” for the bargain that is provided by the map itself—if, in fact, it provides one—is the only extant offer; and without communication, there is no counterproposal that can be made. The conflict gets reconciled—or perhaps we should say ignored—as a by-product of the dominant need for coordination. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 150

Categorization

• XREF: Directly supports the reader’s Gambetta mapping: when legal channels fail and explicit contracting is impossible, the party needing protection cannot refuse the Mafia’s offered terms because there is no counterproposal available — the focal ‘price’ of protection is the only deal on the table. — connects to: The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 668; Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 791; Tacit agreements need qualitatively distinct terms that may discriminate against one party — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 190 (+3 more)
• SEED: A usable angle: the ‘no counterproposal’ logic as an explanation for why victims of private enforcement accept exploitative terms rather than bargaining — the dominant need for coordination forecloses the alternative.

Related

• Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. (similarity 0.82)
• Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones (similarity 0.82)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability (similarity 0.81)
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Tacit agreements need qualitatively distinct terms that may discriminate against one party #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 190