Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games

Evidence

The third payoff would show Holmes and Moriarty both being rewarded if they succeed in getting off at the same station, but Holmes gaining more if both he and Moriarty get off at one particular station, Moriarty gaining more if both get off at some other particular station, both losing unless they get off at the same station. This is the usual nonzero-sum game, or “imperfect-correlation-of-preferences” game. This is the mixture of conflict and mutual dependence that epitomizes bargaining situations. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 213

Categorization

• DEFINE: Gives the reader’s own working definition of bargaining situations — the donor and client both gain from agreement but prefer different terms.
• XREF: This is the exact payoff structure of a Godfather-bond: both parties gain from the deal, but the mafioso and the supplicant prefer different terms of repayment. — connects to: Nuclear arms negotiations are an open-ended bargaining problem beyond fixed payoff matrices — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 515; Every bargaining game ends in a simultaneous final move made in ignorance — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 617; Side payments convert pure games into mixed bargaining games — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 737 (+4 more)

Related

• Bargaining games mix positively and negatively sloped payoff pairs (similarity 0.86)
• Side payments convert pure games into mixed bargaining games (similarity 0.82)
• Conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations (similarity 0.81)
• Nuclear arms negotiations are an open-ended bargaining problem beyond fixed payoff matrices (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Bargaining games mix positively and negatively sloped payoff pairs #expands (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 215