Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations

Evidence

But, if this general line of reasoning is valid, any analysis of explicit bargaining must pay attention to what we might call the “communication” that is inherent in the bargaining situations, the signals that the participants read in the inanimate details of the case. And it means that tacit and explicit bargaining are not thoroughly separate concepts but that the various gradations from tacit bargaining up through types of incompleteness or faulty or limited communication to full communication all show some dependence on the need to coordinate expectations. Hence all show some degree of dependence of the participants themselves on their common inability to keep their eyes off certain outcomes. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 186

Categorization

• DEFINE: Defines the gradation thesis: tacit and explicit bargaining are not separate concepts but a continuum.
• XREF: connects to: Simple discrete salient limits enable coordinated expectations. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 602; Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858; Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 859 (+5 more)

Related

• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players (similarity 0.88)
• Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones (similarity 0.88)
• Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability (similarity 0.86)
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations (similarity 0.86)
• Tacit agreements need qualitatively distinct terms that may discriminate against one party (similarity 0.83)
• Bargaining outcomes rest on convergent reflexive expectations, not on force or merit (similarity 0.83)
• Tacit bargaining over distribution can be conducted only through play itself. (similarity 0.83)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.83)
• Pre-arranged communication infrastructure raises the odds tacit bargaining succeeds (similarity 0.81)
• Simple discrete salient limits enable coordinated expectations. (similarity 0.81)
• Adding free speech barely changes a tacit bargaining game’s character (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit bargaining forces one party to accept an unfair focal point (similarity 0.79)
• Tacit coordination supplies the empirical premise Nash solution concepts require (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 189