Tacit agreements need qualitatively distinct terms that may discriminate against one party

Evidence

If there are important conclusions to be drawn, they are probably these: (1) tacit agreements or agreements arrived at through partial or haphazard negotiation require terms that are qualitatively distinguishable from the alternatives and cannot simply be a matter of degree; (2) when agreement must be reached with incomplete communication, the participants must be ready to allow the situation itself to exercise substantial constraint over the outcome; specifically, a solution that discriminates against one party or the other or even involves “unnecessary” nuisance to both of them may be the only one on which their expectations can be coordinated. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 190

Categorization

  • XREF: The ‘unnecessary nuisance’ outcome — accepting inefficient discrimination as the only coordinable term — maps onto how the Don Corleone model makes parties accept harsh but focal terms the state would reject. — connects to: Tacit bargaining forces one party to accept an unfair focal point — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 150; Total prohibition beats partial limits as a tacit agreement focus — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 191; Tacit limits require qualitative boundaries amenable to complete abstention — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 194
  • DEFINE: Clarifies the defining constraint of tacit agreement: terms must be qualitatively distinguishable (discrete) rather than continuous.