Bargaining games mix positively and negatively sloped payoff pairs

Evidence

The values of any particular outcome of the game, for the two players, would be represented by the two coordinates of a point. All possible outcomes of a pure-conflict game would be represented by some or all of the points on a negatively inclined line, those of a pure common-interest game by some or all of the points on a positively inclined line. In the mixed game, or bargaining situation, at least one pair of points would denote a negative slope and at least one pair a positive slope. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 215

Categorization

• DEFINE: The formal taxonomic tool: a bargaining situation is precisely where some outcome pairs move players together and others against each other.
• XREF: connects to: Nuclear arms negotiations are an open-ended bargaining problem beyond fixed payoff matrices — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 515; Every bargaining game ends in a simultaneous final move made in ignorance — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 617; Side payments convert pure games into mixed bargaining games — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 737 (+2 more)

Related

• Nuclear arms negotiations are an open-ended bargaining problem beyond fixed payoff matrices (similarity 0.87)
• Side payments convert pure games into mixed bargaining games (similarity 0.86)
• Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games (similarity 0.86)
• Conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations (similarity 0.83)
• Tacit bargaining requires coordinating on equivalent solutions, not just equal-valued ones (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289