A mixed-strategy equilibrium can be jointly dominated by a pure coordinating point.

Evidence

The game in Fig. 35 does have another equilibrium point, consisting of an 80:20 mixed strategy for Column and a 40:60 mixture for Row. It yields them payoffs of 3.6 apiece, and is therefore jointly dominated by the upper-left and lower-right cells. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 873

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 658; Among plausible coordination rules, choosing the greater payoff is the more natural — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 676

Related

• Among plausible coordination rules, choosing the greater payoff is the more natural (similarity 0.87)
• Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point (similarity 0.81)
• Partial randomization can turn a conflict-addled game into a profitable equilibrium (similarity 0.79)
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically (similarity 0.79)