In mutual-dependence games possessing initiative can be a disadvantage

Evidence

These are also games in which, though secrecy may play a strategic role, there is some essential need for the signaling of intentions and the meeting of minds. Finally, they are games in which what one player can do to avert mutual damage affects what another player will do to avert it, so that it is not always an advantage to possess initiative, knowledge, or freedom of choice. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202

Categorization

• XREF: This is precisely the Schellingian logic motivating Godfather-bonds as hostages: binding oneself credibly by destroying one’s own initiative is the mechanism. — connects to: One-shot strategic games can lock rational players into collectively worse outcomes.; One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 787; Worsening one’s own outcomes can be strategically advantageous in mixed-motive games. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 358

Related

• Worsening one’s own outcomes can be strategically advantageous in mixed-motive games. (similarity 0.85)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.83)
• Conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations (similarity 0.79)
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically (similarity 0.79)
• One-shot strategic games can lock rational players into collectively worse outcomes. (similarity 0.79)
• Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation (similarity 0.78)