Side payments convert pure games into mixed bargaining games

Evidence

Also, the pure games cannot admit “side payments.” If one of the partners in a pure common-interest game threatens to sabotage the effect unless he is paid—assuming that the communication and enforcement structure of the game makes this possible—a conflict of interest is introduced; in effect, the point denoting the payment of a bribe would appear to the upper left or lower right of another point or points on the upward-sloping line, producing the configuration of a mixed game. And if one of the players in a pure-conflict game can threaten damage or offer compensation to induce his opponent to yield in this game, there is scope for bargaining; there is no longer a relation of pure conflict, and the points denoting the threatened damage or promised compensation would lie off the downward-sloping line. In other words, all pertinent potential outcomes must be allowed for. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 737

Categorization

• XREF: Underpins the reader’s Gambetta mapping: mafia ‘protection’ bribes are side payments that convert a putatively shared interest into a mixed game. — connects to: Bargaining games mix positively and negatively sloped payoff pairs — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 215; Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 213; Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 366

Related

• Bargaining games mix positively and negatively sloped payoff pairs (similarity 0.86)
• Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Bargaining games mix positively and negatively sloped payoff pairs #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 215
• Bargaining situations are imperfect-correlation-of-preferences games #corroborates (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 213
• Strategic principles in mixed-motive games cannot be derived purely analytically #corroborates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 366