Non-symmetry beats both committed symmetry and committed asymmetry.
Evidence
It should be emphasized that the fruitful alternative to symmetry is not the assumption of asymmetry, but just non-symmetry, admitting both symmetry and asymmetry as possibilities without being committed to either as a foregone conclusion. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 631
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Cooperation is symmetric while dependence is asymmetric.; Binding-agreement machinery becomes irrelevant under perfect symmetry — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 624; Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 529 (+1 more)
Related
- Perfect move symmetry neutralizes all interesting bargaining moves in advance. (similarity 0.85)
- Asymmetry cannot be proven inconsistent with player rationality (similarity 0.83)
- Defining rationality to include symmetry strips the theory of empirical content (similarity 0.83)
- Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point (similarity 0.83)
- Mathematical symmetry fails as a bargaining principle under value uncertainty (similarity 0.82)
- Binding-agreement machinery becomes irrelevant under perfect symmetry (similarity 0.82)
- Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. (similarity 0.81)
- Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games. (similarity 0.81)
- Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Binding-agreement machinery becomes irrelevant under perfect symmetry
#corroborates(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 624 - Cooperation is symmetric while dependence is asymmetric.
#corroborates(0.75) - Asymmetry cannot be proven inconsistent with player rationality
#corroborates(0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 643 - Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry.
#corroborates(0.70) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 529