Binding-agreement machinery becomes irrelevant under perfect symmetry

Evidence

At this point it looks as though the cooperative feature of the game is irrelevant. The players really need not show up until 11:59; in fact they do not need to show up at all. The preplay communication and ability to reach binding agreements, which were intended to characterize the game, prove to be irrelevant; the cooperative game as a distinct game from the tacit game does not exist. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 624

Categorization

• XREF: This undercuts the Gambetta private-protection-market premise: if the Corleone deal collapses into a tacit game, then the Credible Commitment machinery that substitutes for state enforcement is precisely what the moveless symmetric model denies — a sharp boundary case for the reader’s framework. — connects to: Mathematical symmetry fails as a bargaining principle under value uncertainty — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 283; Infinite repetition sustains honest exchange without any binding commitment; Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 658 (+2 more)
• DEEPTHINKING: A celebrated formal result (cooperative games may not exist as distinct games) delivered through pure operational reasoning; dense enough that the reasoning warrants re-reading.

Related

• Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point (similarity 0.85)
• Perfect move symmetry neutralizes all interesting bargaining moves in advance. (similarity 0.84)
• Non-symmetry beats both committed symmetry and committed asymmetry. (similarity 0.82)
• Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games. (similarity 0.79)
• Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. (similarity 0.79)
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Mathematical symmetry fails as a bargaining principle under value uncertainty #complicates (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 283
• Rules that always yield to rule-free optimization cease to function as rules #complicates (0.80) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 222
• Infinite repetition sustains honest exchange without any binding commitment #corroborates (0.78)
• Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point #corroborates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 658