Perfect move symmetry neutralizes all interesting bargaining moves in advance.

Evidence

The perfectly move-symmetrical cooperative game seems a little like that foot race. Bargaining in the one case is as unavailing as leg-work in the other; every player knows in advance that all moves and tactics are foredoomed to neutralization by the symmetrical potentialities available to his opponent. The interesting elements that we might inject in the bargaining game are meaningless if perfect symmetry, and its acceptance as inevitable by both players, are imposed on the game by its definition. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 634

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Milgrom-North-Weingast on private judges: where both parties hold perfectly symmetric enforcement power, no credible commitment can be struck. — connects to: Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 641; Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 635; Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 658

Related

• Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. (similarity 0.91)
• Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games. (similarity 0.88)
• Pure symmetry can single out a unique tacit-coordination point (similarity 0.87)
• Non-symmetry beats both committed symmetry and committed asymmetry. (similarity 0.85)
• Binding-agreement machinery becomes irrelevant under perfect symmetry (similarity 0.84)
• Asymmetry cannot be proven inconsistent with player rationality (similarity 0.83)
• The bargaining solution’s appeal derives from its focal quality, not its formal derivation (similarity 0.82)
• Defining rationality to include symmetry strips the theory of empirical content (similarity 0.79)
• Mathematical symmetry fails as a bargaining principle under value uncertainty (similarity 0.79)
• Conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Move asymmetry is what makes cooperative game theory interesting. #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 641
• Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games. #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 635