Partner choice theory shifts cooperation research away from dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma models.
Evidence
Recognizing that actors assort via partner choice, and that this can have a large impact on the evolution of cooperation, are good ideas. It is step away from the simple dyadic structure and Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)–centric worldview that has dominated theory for so long (Trivers 2006). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 254
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the reader’s framework of partner-choice as disruption mechanism — the Japanese authorities’ fumi-e ritual is precisely an attack on assortative partner choice rather than on internal moral conviction. — connects to: Cooperation arises from partner choice, not reciprocal tit-for-tat, across species and human development. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 593; Exit and voice parallel partner-choice versus punishment responses — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 213; Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 610 (+4 more)
Related
- Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.87)
- Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control (similarity 0.87)
- Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. (similarity 0.86)
- Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.86)
- Cooperation arises from partner choice, not reciprocal tit-for-tat, across species and human development. (similarity 0.84)
- Partner choice deters cheating without anyone intending to punish (similarity 0.84)
- Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.83)
- Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does. (similarity 0.83)
- Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.83)
- The underdetermination of partner-control models explains moral diversity, not failure. (similarity 0.83)
- Fairness emerges when partner choice links each interaction to outside opportunities. (similarity 0.83)
- Partner selection produces genuine moral feelings, not just narrow self-interested cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
- Fairness equilibria require group-selection processes beyond partner choice alone. (similarity 0.82)
- Partner-choice cooperation theory does not explain the intrinsic moral sense. (similarity 0.82)
- Cooperation outcomes depend on partner choice frequency, not rule fairness. (similarity 0.82)
Broader Connections
- Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control
#corroborates(0.88) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 347 - Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control
#corroborates(0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 610 - Cooperation outcomes depend on partner choice frequency, not rule fairness.
#corroborates(0.78) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 257 - The underdetermination of partner-control models explains moral diversity, not failure.
#contradicts(0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 450 - Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation
#contradicts(0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202