Natural variation among partners drives selection toward greater cooperation.

Evidence

In reality, however, populations are never entirely monomorphic for a single level of cooperation (as exemplified by the experiments of Gill, Packer, & van Bavel [Gill et al.]). There are always natural sources of variations such that it pays to compare potential partners and to choose the most cooperative, yielding a selective pressure in favor of ever more cooperative individuals. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 619

Categorization

• XREF: The mechanism of endogenous variation fueling selection parallels the incomplete-gods angle: a uniform pantheon removes the variation that makes comparative partner assessment (and thus moral upgrade) possible. — connects to: Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 531; Cooperation arises from partner choice, not reciprocal tit-for-tat, across species and human development. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 593; Cooperation might evolve spontaneously without anyone manipulating it (+4 more)

Related

• Cooperation arises from partner choice, not reciprocal tit-for-tat, across species and human development. (similarity 0.83)
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. (similarity 0.83)
• Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. (similarity 0.83)
• Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.81)
• Natural selection favors both the disposition to reciprocate and to volunteer help proactively. (similarity 0.80)
• Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.80)
• Partner choice selects among folk-theorem equilibria just as group selection does. (similarity 0.80)
• Partner selection produces genuine moral feelings, not just narrow self-interested cooperation. (similarity 0.80)
• Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperation and morality are distinct categories. (similarity 0.80)
• Partner choice theory shifts cooperation research away from dyadic Prisoner’s Dilemma models. (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperation outcomes depend on partner choice frequency, not rule fairness. (similarity 0.80)
• Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.79)
• Meritocratic fairness norms evolved as adaptations to partner-choice markets (similarity 0.79)
• Morality evolved as a propensity for fair cost-benefit sharing among cooperators. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Cooperation might evolve spontaneously without anyone manipulating it #expands (0.75)