One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position

Evidence

It also explains why a “promise” to abstain from a choice that would damage the other player may not be welcomed by him. A promise that permits him safely to make a particular choice may assure us that he would make it, so that we can count on it and make some prior choice that is to his disadvantage. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 787

Categorization

• XREF: Directly parallels the racketeer/mafia dynamic and the Godfather-bond logic the reader is assembling. — connects to: Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 471; Reformulated claims bargaining gives players perverse incentives to demand everything. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 627; Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 347 (+4 more)

Related

• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.86)
• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly (similarity 0.86)
• Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.85)
• In mutual-dependence games possessing initiative can be a disadvantage (similarity 0.83)
• Linking two separate negotiations can enable threats impossible within a single game. (similarity 0.82)
• Commitment includes removing options, delegating fulfilment, and self-handicapping (similarity 0.82)
• Strategic moves work by constraining one’s own behavior to shape an opponent’s expectations. (similarity 0.81)
• Irreversible commitments force the enemy, not oneself, to be the one who yields. (similarity 0.81)
• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy (similarity 0.81)
• Conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations (similarity 0.81)
• Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted (similarity 0.81)
• Reformulated claims bargaining gives players perverse incentives to demand everything. (similarity 0.81)
• A credible conditional commitment must combine both a promise and a threat. (similarity 0.81)
• Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions (similarity 0.80)
• Worsening one’s own outcomes can be strategically advantageous in mixed-motive games. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 347
• Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game #qualifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 299
• In mutual-dependence games possessing initiative can be a disadvantage #corroborates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202