Commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a determinate two-move game

Evidence

If the institutional environment makes it possible for a potential buyer to make a single “final” offer subject to extreme penalty in the event he should amend the offer—to commit himself—there remains but a single, well-determined decision for the seller: to sell at the price proposed or to forego the sale. The possibility of commitment converts an indeterminate bargaining situation into a two-move game; one player assumes a commitment, and the other makes a final decision. The game has become determinate. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 289

Categorization

• XREF: The determinate two-move structure maps onto the Don’s single ‘final’ offer with clear consequences — when he makes the offer ‘that cannot be refused,’ the game becomes determinate exactly as Schelling describes. — connects to: Leaving a final standing offer is a winning commitment tactic. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 636; Non-symmetric moves like commitments and threats enrich cooperative games. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 635; One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 787 (+6 more)

Related

• Leaving a final standing offer is a winning commitment tactic. (similarity 0.85)
• Committing to a strategy can yield a better outcome than remaining uncommitted (similarity 0.81)
• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy (similarity 0.80)