Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms

Evidence

Practice legitimates because legitimacy is a matter of practice. Some may take my obstinate refusal to provide a nontrivial validation of arguments as implying that legal propositions cannot therefore be true or false. I do not deny that legal propositions have truthconditions. I deny only that these can be satisfied in any nontrivial way-in any way external to the practice itself. A proposition of constitutional law is true if it forms part of the rationale offered in support of a legal decision and if that rationale is composed of the kinds of arguments recognized in legal practice as legitimate. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 438

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Wittgenstein’s rule-following and internalist accounts of truth in philosophy of language. — connects to: Legal processes demand knowledge forms that exclude legitimate ways of knowing — Jamal Awil, The Whispering Archive: The Complete…, 547; Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 59; Legal propositions have truth conditions but defy simple truth valuation. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 385 (+7 more)

Related

• and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… (similarity 0.88)
• Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation. (similarity 0.87)
• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval (similarity 0.86)
• Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. (similarity 0.86)
• Legal propositions have truth conditions but defy simple truth valuation. (similarity 0.86)
• Legal propositions are true when they invite competent professional assent. (similarity 0.86)
• It is true that, in my law classes, I spend a good deal of time with students practicing various kinds of argument. Every professor does this-every one must, although perhaps usually less… (similarity 0.85)
• Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. (similarity 0.85)
• Legal legitimacy is structural contingency, not shared conviction (similarity 0.84)
• Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not… (similarity 0.84)
• Obsessing over what makes legal statements true has misled jurisprudence. (similarity 0.83)
• Legitimacy and justification are distinct concepts in constitutional theory. (similarity 0.82)
• Dehumanizing discourses need not be true, only resonant, to become law. (similarity 0.82)
• A constitutional grammar lets nonjudicial actors reason legally about constitutional questions. (similarity 0.81)
• For me, the use of the six forms of constitutional argument is the way we decide constitutional questions in the American legal culture. The use of these six forms maintains the legitimacy of… (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• It is true that, in my law classes, I spend a good deal of time with students practicing various kinds of argument. Every professor does this-every one must, although perhaps usually less… #exemplifies (0.85)
• Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. #corroborates (0.80) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 386
• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval #corroborates (0.75) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 437
• Validity of a syllogism relates exclusively to form rather than content #complicates (0.45) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 443