Legal propositions have truth conditions but defy simple truth valuation.
Evidence
Now my view is not that all legal propositions are neither true nor false, nor that they have no truth conditions, but rather that a grasp of their — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 385
Categorization
- QUESTION: The paragraph cuts off mid-sentence; what completes ‘a grasp of their…’? Would want the full claim before relying on it.
- XREF: connects to: Legal inductions represent probabilities rather than absolute truths. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 550; Inductive legal generalization produces workable probabilities rather than absolute truths. — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 339; Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 386 (+2 more)
Related
- Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. (similarity 0.88)
- Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms (similarity 0.86)
- Legal inductions represent probabilities rather than absolute truths. (similarity 0.86)
- Legal reasoning yields probability rather than absolute mathematical truths (similarity 0.85)
- Obsessing over what makes legal statements true has misled jurisprudence. (similarity 0.85)
- Legal propositions are true when they invite competent professional assent. (similarity 0.84)
- Inductive legal generalization produces workable probabilities rather than absolute truths. (similarity 0.83)
- Inductive reasoning yields probability while deduction yields certainty (similarity 0.82)
- Law lacks fixed major premises unlike math and science (similarity 0.81)
- The ability to study law depends on recognizing logical connections in cases (similarity 0.80)
- Dehumanizing discourses need not be true, only resonant, to become law. (similarity 0.80)
- Legal processes demand knowledge forms that exclude legitimate ways of knowing (similarity 0.80)
- Factual propositions cannot be sustained merely by citing negative evidence (similarity 0.79)
- Sound legal arguments require both valid reasoning and true premises (similarity 0.79)
- Identifying valid legal criteria in any system is an empirical question of fact (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Legal inductions represent probabilities rather than absolute truths.
#qualifies(0.70) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 550 - Inductive legal generalization produces workable probabilities rather than absolute truths.
#expands(0.65) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 339 - Legal reasoning yields probability rather than absolute mathematical truths
#qualifies(0.65) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 242 - Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions.
#complicates(0.60) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 386 - Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms
#qualifies(0.60) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 438