Legal propositions are true when they invite competent professional assent.

Evidence

For Patterson, a proposition of law is true when the reasons advanced in support of the proposition are such as to invite the assent of competent professionals. Consistent with this, Patterson denies that doing law correctly is a matter of correct “interpretation” because this would account for the truth of propositions of law by reference to something outside the legal discourse. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 387

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Defines Patterson’s practice-based criterion of legal truth.
  • XREF: Resonates with Rorty’s and the pragmatists’ consensus-based epistemic accounts, and contrasts with Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law. — connects to: Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 48; Internal legal statements manifest an accepted shared framework of rules. — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 326; Sound legal arguments require both valid reasoning and true premises — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 250 (+2 more)

Broader Connections