Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications.

Evidence

For some time, the academic debate about U.S. constitutionalism has looked for justifications for our practices, believing this would confer legitimacy on them. In my work, I have endeavored to derive legitimacy from the practices themselves, reserving the task of justification for other — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 15

Categorization

• SEED: A contrarian essay angle: challenge the default assumption that practices need external justification to gain legitimacy.
• XREF: connects to: Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not share, and especially on conflating the ideas of legitimacy and justification and ignoring the distinction between constitutional decisionmaking and constitutional discourse.; and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly moral enterprise, but; Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone. — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 48 (+23 more)

Related

• and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… (similarity 0.94)
• Legitimacy and justification are distinct concepts in constitutional theory. (similarity 0.92)
• Legal legitimacy is structural contingency, not shared conviction (similarity 0.91)
• Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation. (similarity 0.91)
• Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not… (similarity 0.88)
• Legitimacy is better understood as contingency control than as justification or consent. (similarity 0.88)
• Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms (similarity 0.86)
• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval (similarity 0.86)
• Classical constitutional puzzles reduce fundamentally to questions of legitimacy and legitimation. (similarity 0.84)
• Postmodern constitutional thought marks a shift from truth to meaning. (similarity 0.82)
• For me, the use of the six forms of constitutional argument is the way we decide constitutional questions in the American legal culture. The use of these six forms maintains the legitimacy of… (similarity 0.82)
• A constitutional grammar lets nonjudicial actors reason legally about constitutional questions. (similarity 0.81)
• Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. (similarity 0.81)
• Any external normativity contaminates practice-derived legitimation entirely. (similarity 0.80)
• Constitutional argument and constitutional discourse are distinct activities with different boundaries. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation. #expands (0.85) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 59
• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval #expands (0.80) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 437
• Legitimacy and justification are distinct concepts in constitutional theory. #corroborates (0.75) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 451
• Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. #expands (0.70) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 386
• Appeal to tradition may be legitimate within constitutional law #exemplifies (0.60) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 1068
• Postmodern constitutional thought marks a shift from truth to meaning. #corroborates (0.60) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 874