A constitutional grammar lets nonjudicial actors reason legally about constitutional questions.

Evidence

One of the objectives of my work in developing this kind of grammar of constitutional law has been to enable constitutional decisionmakers to take up nonjudicial questions and to enable nonjudicial decisionmakers to take up constitutional questions generally, from a legal point of view. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 526

Categorization

• SEED: The idea that a shared constitutional grammar could let varied decisionmakers legally address questions could anchor a piece on public reasoning and institutional roles.
• XREF: connects to: Popular consent legitimizes citizen enforcement of constitutional interpretation. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 309; Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 437; Grammar is the set of rules enabling participation in a language game. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 446 (+7 more)

Related

• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval (similarity 0.83)
• Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms. (similarity 0.83)
• Constitutional argument and constitutional discourse are distinct activities with different boundaries. (similarity 0.82)
• and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… (similarity 0.82)
• For me, the use of the six forms of constitutional argument is the way we decide constitutional questions in the American legal culture. The use of these six forms maintains the legitimacy of… (similarity 0.82)
• Constitutional interpretation and constitutional discourse are distinct practices. (similarity 0.81)
• Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms (similarity 0.81)
• Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not… (similarity 0.81)
• I further believed that journalists, and citizens generally, could make use of these forms of legal argument, although they were not confined to legal argument in making constitutional decisions… (similarity 0.81)
• Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. (similarity 0.81)
• Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation. (similarity 0.81)
• Modern constitutional law rests on open-textured phrases, not clear constitutional text. (similarity 0.78)
• Postmodern constitutional thought marks a shift from truth to meaning. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. #corroborates (0.65) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 386
• Legal and non-legal deciders draw on different but overlapping argument forms. #expands (0.60) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 496
• It is true that, in my law classes, I spend a good deal of time with students practicing various kinds of argument. Every professor does this-every one must, although perhaps usually less… #exemplifies (0.60)
• Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. #corroborates (0.55) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 15
• Legal major premises derive authority from constitutional text or statutes #expands (0.55) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 242
• Deductive legal reasoning requires identifying the controlling major premise. #expands (0.50) — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 751