Legal processes demand knowledge forms that exclude legitimate ways of knowing

Evidence

The most suppressed aspect: in multiple congressional hearings, Gwich’in representatives have been asked to separate the “factual” arguments from the “cultural” arguments — to present only the data, not the relationship. This request assumes that the most cogent form of knowledge is the form that can be legislated. The Gwich’in refusal to separate the two is itself the argument: the land cannot be understood through the categories that the legal process provides. Its value exceeds those categories. The debate beat is this refusal. — Jamal Awil, The Whispering Archive, 547

Categorization

  • XREF: Connects to the Antigone/Hegel passage (§503) — both claim situations exceed the categories available to the dominant legal system. — connects to: Knowledge of logical canons enables the detection of misleading legal arguments — Ruggero J. Aldisert, Agatha D. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers- A Guide to Clear…, 97; Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 438; Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 386 (+2 more)

Broader Connections