Legal legitimacy is structural contingency, not shared conviction

Evidence

This, I believed, meant either that certain propositions of constitutional law functioned as modalities, determining the truth of other propositions, but were themselves indeterminable as to this truth, or that some external structure validated these propositions. If it was the former, then their legitimacy derived from their use alone, and from nothing else. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 59 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

For some time, the academic debate about U.S. constitutionalism has looked for justifications for our practices, believing this would confer legitimacy on them. In my work, I have endeavored to derive legitimacy from the practices themselves, reserving the task of justification for other — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 15 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Power cannot self-realize but depends on societal-structural conditions for legitimacy; Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 15; Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 59 (+18 more)

Related

• Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation. (similarity 0.94)
• Legitimacy is better understood as contingency control than as justification or consent. (similarity 0.92)
• Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. (similarity 0.91)
• Legitimacy and justification are distinct concepts in constitutional theory. (similarity 0.88)
• and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… (similarity 0.87)
• Classical constitutional puzzles reduce fundamentally to questions of legitimacy and legitimation. (similarity 0.85)
• Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms (similarity 0.84)
• Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. (similarity 0.83)
• Any external normativity contaminates practice-derived legitimation entirely. (similarity 0.82)
• Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone. (similarity 0.81)
• Both law’s traditionalists and its critics assume legitimacy requires determinate maxims (similarity 0.81)
• Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not… (similarity 0.81)
• Law creates legitimacy structurally by formatting power-holders into chains of mutual recourse (similarity 0.81)
• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval (similarity 0.78)
• Postmodern constitutional thought marks a shift from truth to meaning. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Power cannot self-realize but depends on societal-structural conditions for legitimacy #expands (0.70)
• Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation. #exemplifies (0.70) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 59
• Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. #exemplifies (0.65) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 15
• Legal systems rest on customary social rules rather than moral foundations #corroborates (0.60) — HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law…, 56
• Legal validity derives from normative authority, not from physical power alone. #qualifies (0.55) — Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 48