Legitimacy and justification are distinct concepts in constitutional theory.

Evidence

In my case, they see me playing a double game: While I profess to derive legitimacy for legal argument from the use of the modalities, I also want to be able to defend certain decisions and certain practices, and thus I play both a descriptive and a normative role. Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not share, and especially on conflating the ideas of legitimacy and justification and ignoring the distinction between constitutional decisionmaking and constitutional discourse. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 451

Categorization

• DEFINE: Draws the key distinction between a practice being legitimate (flowing from accepted forms of argument) and its being justified (morally or substantively right) — central to Bobbitt’s constitutional method.
• XREF: Connects to Bobbitt’s own ‘Constitutional Fate’ framework distinguishing the modalities’ legitimacy from moral justification. — connects to: and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly moral enterprise, but; Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 15; Classical constitutional puzzles reduce fundamentally to questions of legitimacy and legitimation. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 16 (+6 more)

Related

• Legitimacy can be derived from constitutional practices rather than from justifications. (similarity 0.92)
• and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… (similarity 0.89)
• Classical constitutional puzzles reduce fundamentally to questions of legitimacy and legitimation. (similarity 0.88)
• Legal legitimacy is structural contingency, not shared conviction (similarity 0.88)
• Constitutional law’s foundational modalities derive legitimacy from use alone, not external validation. (similarity 0.87)
• Balkin and Levinson conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on several assumptions that I do not… (similarity 0.87)
• Legitimacy is better understood as contingency control than as justification or consent. (similarity 0.86)
• Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms (similarity 0.82)
• Both law’s traditionalists and its critics assume legitimacy requires determinate maxims (similarity 0.81)
• Forms of constitutional argument are validated by their presence in practice, not by approval (similarity 0.81)
• Constitutional argument and constitutional discourse are distinct activities with different boundaries. (similarity 0.80)
• Bobbitt asks whether Patterson believes in the pricelessness of human beings because humans are capable of love, that our decisions are impossible to explain causally because they are products of… (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Legal legitimacy is structural contingency, not shared conviction #expands (0.80)
• Both law’s traditionalists and its critics assume legitimacy requires determinate maxims #expands (0.30) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 824