Dehumanizing discourses need not be true, only resonant, to become law.

Evidence

The account of meaning in terms of truth conditions has to be replaced by an account of meaning in terms of the conditions under which our practices legitimate our making such statements, including conditions under which the legitimation may be overturned. What legitimates a legal statement does so only in view of the facts of our common practices. This is very much in sympathy with Patterson’s efforts to treat law, jurisprudentially, as a practice. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 386 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
• XREF: connects to: Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 386

Related

• Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. (similarity 0.85)
• Obsessing over what makes legal statements true has misled jurisprudence. (similarity 0.83)
• Legal propositions are true only within the practice’s own recognized forms (similarity 0.82)
• Legal propositions have truth conditions but defy simple truth valuation. (similarity 0.80)
• Legal propositions are true when they invite competent professional assent. (similarity 0.79)
• and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law. American constitutional law can be a profoundly… (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Legal meaning derives from practices of legitimation, not truth conditions. #corroborates (0.70) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 386