Fairness evolved as a costly signal of impartiality to avoid third-party condemnation.
Evidence
People rank their allies, but do not want others to know that they rank their allies (DeScioli & Kurzban 2009). One possibility is that people do not want to be explicit about ranking others because they want to avoid negative reactions from those who receive a low rank. This leads to a possible explanation for why fairness may have evolved: as a way for people to signal to others that they are impartial, and thereby avoid being condemned by third parties for trying to demonstrate or initiate alliances based on preferential sharing. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 574
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the reader’s ongoing synthesis of Silencing by Sign and the Big God mechanism: this is the precise partner-choice signal that the fumi-e ritual is designed to destroy—if fairness is a signal of impartiality against preferential alliance-making, then forcing public apostasy dissolves that signal and reveals the ranking of allies. — connects to: Competitive signalling may drive moral conduct beyond mere fairness. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 526; Moralistic punishment of defectors is itself a costly reputational signal. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 532; Fairness rests on impartiality, not mutualistic cooperation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 563 (+3 more)
- ADDENDUM: Directly extends the ‘On Sacrifice’ piece and the fumi-e analysis: the ritual coercion of public betrayal is exactly the mechanism for forcing the now-visible ranking of allies.
Related
- Competitive signalling may drive moral conduct beyond mere fairness. (similarity 0.85)
- Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.83)
- Fairness rests on impartiality, not mutualistic cooperation. (similarity 0.82)
- Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. (similarity 0.80)
- Deriving fairness from bargaining power threatens to reduce moral norms to mere bargaining. (similarity 0.79)
- Fairness evolves from partner choice, not partner control (similarity 0.79)
- Consistent self-serving calculations send inconsistent fairness signals to a community. (similarity 0.78)
- A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. (similarity 0.78)
- Moralistic punishment of defectors is itself a costly reputational signal. (similarity 0.78)
- A disposition to fairness can evolve even when unshared, unlike a disposition to cooperate. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Moral fairness may itself have been shaped by natural selection.
#expands(0.85) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 12 - Altruism can be weaponized purely to offend a third party
#complicates(0.78) - Social disapproval of impartiality serves group welfare beyond mere cowardice-suspicion
#expands(0.75)