Seemingly fair outcomes can arise from self-referent loss aversion rather than fairness preferences.

Evidence

However, we argue that seemingly fair outcomes need not be based on fairness preferences. While fairness preferences imply that individuals monitor and respond to the relative payoffs accruing to themselves and to a partner, a simpler alternative is that individuals have an internal expectation about payoffs from an interaction and adjust their behaviour (e.g., by switching partners) if these expectations are violated (Chen & Santos 2006). Crucially, responses based on fairness preferences and responses based on self-referent loss aversion can both lead to cooperative and fair outcomes. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 312

Categorization

• QUESTION: This distinction between fairness preferences and self-referent loss aversion is worth chasing — it bears directly on how much cognitive machinery ‘moral’ behavior requires.
• XREF: Connects to the reader’s Big God analysis of Father Rodrigues’ internal moral compass in relation to the mechanism question. — connects to: Humans pervasively prefer meritocratic benefit distributions. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 93; Perceived ownership rights, not raw fairness, determine ultimatum-game rejection rates. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 130; Contributions carry implicit fairness judgments that trigger blame and counter-blame. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 191 (+4 more)

Related

• Shared fairness intuitions cannot explain distributive variability when beliefs and situations are held constant. (similarity 0.85)
• Humans pervasively prefer meritocratic benefit distributions. (similarity 0.84)
• Fairness evolved to distribute payoffs by input, not equally. (similarity 0.84)
• A preference for fairness can directly favor equalitarianism in cooperation. (similarity 0.83)
• Fairness judgments track each participant’s earned contribution, not just payoff equality. (similarity 0.82)
• Equality-as-salient-point cannot explain unequal fair distributions (similarity 0.81)
• Consistent self-serving calculations send inconsistent fairness signals to a community. (similarity 0.81)
• Fairness is self-interested because stingy partners get abandoned. (similarity 0.80)
• Morality evolved as a propensity for fair cost-benefit sharing among cooperators. (similarity 0.79)
• People disagree persistently about what makes inequality fair (similarity 0.79)
• Deriving fairness from bargaining power threatens to reduce moral norms to mere bargaining. (similarity 0.79)
• Earned entitlements reshape perceived fairness in resource division. (similarity 0.79)
• Fairness is not reducible to mutualistic partner choice. (similarity 0.79)
• Morality is an evolved sense of fairness, not a late intellectual achievement (similarity 0.79)
• Morality is about fair cooperation, not maximizing welfare. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Shared fairness intuitions cannot explain distributive variability when beliefs and situations are held constant. #corroborates (0.82) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 326