Genuinely moral partners signal higher reliability than strategically moral ones.
Evidence
To answer the challenge, it is necessary to consider not only the perspective of an individual wanting to be chosen as a partner, but also that of an individual or a group deciding with whom to cooperate. This is an important decision that may secure or jeopardize the success of cooperation. Hence, just as there should have been selective pressure to behave so as to be seen as a reliable partner, there should have been selective pressure to develop and invest adequate cognitive resources in recognizing truly reliable partners. Imagine that you have the choice between two possible partners, call them Bob and Ann, both of whom have, as far as you know, been reliable partners in cooperation in the past. Bob respects the interests of others for the reason and to the extent that it is in his interest to do so. Ann respects the interests of others because she values doing so per se. In other words, she has moral motivations. As a result, in circumstances where it might be advantageous for your partner to cheat, Ann is less likely to do so than Bob. This, everything else being equal, makes Ann a more reliable and hence a more desirable partner than Bob. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 59
Categorization
- XREF: Connects directly to Baumard et al. partner-choice theory the reader cites about the fumi-e scenes destroying partner choice. — connects to: Moral conduct serves as a costly signal that pays in partner selection. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 534; Partner selection produces genuine moral feelings, not just narrow self-interested cooperation. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 202; Believed moral compunction in another gives strong reason to rely on them (+2 more)
- ADDENDUM: Supports the reading of Father Rodrigues’s visible apostasy: the fumi-e forces observable evidence of instrumental vs. moral motivations that would otherwise be hard to ascertain.
Related
- Moral conduct serves as a costly signal that pays in partner selection. (similarity 0.85)
- Partner selection produces genuine moral feelings, not just narrow self-interested cooperation. (similarity 0.85)
- Competitive signalling may drive moral conduct beyond mere fairness. (similarity 0.83)
- Morality may have evolved via partner choice over partner control (similarity 0.83)
- Morality evolves from individual partner-choice competition, not group selection. (similarity 0.82)
- Morality evolved because fair partners were preferred in cooperative interactions (similarity 0.81)
- Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. (similarity 0.81)
- Altruism without genuine moral emotion signals unreliable future cooperation. (similarity 0.81)
- Altruistic cooperators still choose partners they trust and cooperate only where reciprocation is possible. (similarity 0.80)
- Morality requires mutual advantage, not strict accounting of reciprocated acts. (similarity 0.80)
- Partner choice deters cheating without anyone intending to punish (similarity 0.80)
- Partner-choice cooperation theory does not explain the intrinsic moral sense. (similarity 0.80)
- A genuine moral sense evolved to secure reputation as a cooperator (similarity 0.80)
- Transparency of evaluation is itself a trait weighed in partner choice. (similarity 0.80)
- Fairness is self-interested because stingy partners get abandoned. (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Believed moral compunction in another gives strong reason to rely on them
#corroborates(0.85) - Partner selection produces genuine moral feelings, not just narrow self-interested cooperation.
#expands(0.82) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 202 - Competitive signalling may drive moral conduct beyond mere fairness.
#expands(0.75) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 526 - Moral characters of trustworthiness can make people trust even against reason.
#corroborates(0.72)