Altruistic cooperators still choose partners they trust and cooperate only where reciprocation is possible.

Evidence

Although their motivation is substantially altruistic (i.e., they are willing to bear more costs and derive fewer benefits than others), we suspect that individuals with a general or altruistic disposition to cooperate are likely to exhibit some behaviors that are consistent with the mutualistic framework. First, we hypothesize that although these individuals often tend to cooperate regardless of others’ decisions during specific interactions, they are still likely to pay close attention to others’ responses and choose to interact with people they trust to respond fairly or altruistically. Second, these individuals are also likely to be sensitive to cooperative environmental affordances; that is, they may tend to cooperate only in contexts where cooperation is possible (e.g., contributions have a reasonable chance of being reciprocated) and likely to increase benefits. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 410

Categorization

• XREF: Relates to the reader’s framework on partner choice (Baumard et al.) — this passage shows even genuinely altruistic dispositions operate through selective partner choice, which matters for the reading of Portuguese priests choosing among Japanese parishioners. — connects to: Trustworthiness persists only while future gains from the relationship outweigh defection; Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781; Cooperation can be sustained by partner exclusion rather than by punitive coercion. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality: The…, 173 (+5 more)

Related

• Natural selection favors both the disposition to reciprocate and to volunteer help proactively. (similarity 0.84)
• Morality requires mutual advantage, not strict accounting of reciprocated acts. (similarity 0.84)
• Generalized reciprocity cannot be explained by partner-control mechanisms. (similarity 0.84)
• Reciprocal altruism is really mutualism, not altruism (similarity 0.84)
• Cooperation arises from partner choice, not reciprocal tit-for-tat, across species and human development. (similarity 0.83)
• Competitive altruism permits unconditional giving rather than matched reciprocity (similarity 0.82)
• Competition for partners drives costly reputation-building cooperation. (similarity 0.81)
• Cooperative relationships require asymmetric giving at their outset (similarity 0.81)
• Altruism without genuine moral emotion signals unreliable future cooperation. (similarity 0.81)
• Genuinely moral partners signal higher reliability than strategically moral ones. (similarity 0.80)
• Fairness is self-interested because stingy partners get abandoned. (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperation outcomes depend on partner choice frequency, not rule fairness. (similarity 0.80)
• Partner choice predicts fair cooperation while group selection predicts utilitarian cooperation. (similarity 0.80)
• Cooperation is stabilized either by punishing cheaters or by exiting to new partners. (similarity 0.80)
• Stable unconditional cooperation exists and mutualism alone cannot explain it. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Cooperation arises from partner choice, not reciprocal tit-for-tat, across species and human development. #corroborates (0.82) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 593
• Trust only arises where opportunistic behavior is genuinely possible #expands (0.82)
• Cooperation can be sustained by partner exclusion rather than by punitive coercion. #corroborates (0.80) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 173
• Trust requires both freedom to defect and constraints that make cooperation attractive #expands (0.80)
• Trustworthiness persists only while future gains from the relationship outweigh defection #expands (0.78)
• Trust is a result rather than a precondition of cooperation #qualifies (0.75) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2781
• Competitive altruism permits unconditional giving rather than matched reciprocity #contradicts (0.72) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 530
• Mutual trust cannot develop in unequal, nonreciprocal power relations #complicates (0.72) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 477