Business policy dominance stems from numerical advantage, not superior per-group clout

Evidence

The importance of business groups’ numerical advantage is also revealed when we rescale our measures of business and mass-oriented interest-group alignments to reflect the differing number of groups in each of these categories. Using this rescaled measure, a parallel analysis to that in table 4 shows that on a group-for-group basis the average individual business group and the average mass-oriented group appears to be about equally influential. The greater total influence of business groups in our analysis results chiefly from the fact that more of them are generally engaged on each issue (roughly twice as many, on average), not that a single business-oriented group has more clout on average than a single mass-based group. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 124

Categorization

• SEED: Article angle: ‘Bias by numbers’ — how entrenched policy capture can be sustained by counting alone, where equal per-actor power still yields lopsided aggregate outcomes.
• QUESTION: Worth chasing: does the same numerical-dominance + cohesion logic explain why elite factions win intra-state policy fights rather than any moral or tactical superiority?
• XREF: connects to: Business dominance stems from group numbers, not greater per-group influence. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 124

Related

• Business dominance stems from group numbers, not greater per-group influence. (similarity 0.93)
• Business lobbying dominance stems from group count, not per-group clout (similarity 0.92)
• Business interest groups wield roughly twice the policy influence of mass-based groups. (similarity 0.85)
• Interest groups do not amplify majority policy preferences; business groups dominate despite opposing them. (similarity 0.84)
• Interest-group power is measured as a logged count of powerful groups per side. (similarity 0.84)
• Business and mass-based interest groups oppose proposed policy changes at similar rates (similarity 0.81)
• Business interest groups oppose policy changes less often than mass-based groups do. (similarity 0.80)
• Powerful business interest groups actively oppose average citizens’ policy preferences. (similarity 0.80)
• Economic elites dominate US policy while average citizens exert little influence (similarity 0.80)
• Average citizens have little independent influence on U.S. policy relative to economic elites. (similarity 0.78)
• Interest groups shape policy independent of citizen and elite preferences. (similarity 0.78)
• Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page — Testing Theories of American Politics Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Business dominance stems from group numbers, not greater per-group influence. #corroborates (1.00) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 124