Business interest groups oppose policy changes less often than mass-based groups do.

Evidence

The expellee organizations possessed extensive “negative” influence, i.e., the ability to prevent the government and the main parties from adopting, or even publicly discussing, certain controversial policy options, such as the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line or, to a somewhat lesser degree, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe. As a part of this “negative” influence, the expellee groups were also able to ensure that the government and the three parties did not deviate from their established public stances on such key issues as the expellees’ rights to their homelands and to self-determination. The primary reasons for the “negative” power of the organizations were twofold: their usefulness to the Adenauer government’s broader foreign policy program, particularly prior to May 1955, and their presumed electoral clout. However, despite their extensive “negative” influence, the expellee groups lacked a more “constructive” kind of power, i.e., the ability actively to participate in the formulation and implementation of the Federal Republic’s policies toward Eastern Europe. — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 178 (#complicates, via linked claim)

The importance of business groups’ numerical advantage is also revealed when we rescale our measures of business and mass-oriented interest-group alignments to reflect the differing number of groups in each of these categories. Using this rescaled measure, a parallel analysis to that in table 4 shows that on a group-for-group basis the average individual business group and the average mass-oriented group appears to be about equally influential. The greater total influence of business groups in our analysis results chiefly from the fact that more of them are generally engaged on each issue (roughly twice as many, on average), not that a single business-oriented group has more clout on average than a single mass-based group. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 124 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Expellee groups could veto policy options but not shape policy positively — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 178; Business dominance stems from group numbers, not greater per-group influence. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics:…, 124; Much of the business community stopped opposing strict environmental law by the mid-1990s. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 712

Related

• Business and mass-based interest groups oppose proposed policy changes at similar rates (similarity 0.86)
• Business dominance stems from group numbers, not greater per-group influence. (similarity 0.83)
• Expellee groups could veto policy options but not shape policy positively (similarity 0.81)
• Business lobbying dominance stems from group count, not per-group clout (similarity 0.80)
• Business policy dominance stems from numerical advantage, not superior per-group clout (similarity 0.80)
• Business interest groups wield roughly twice the policy influence of mass-based groups. (similarity 0.80)
• Powerful business interest groups actively oppose average citizens’ policy preferences. (similarity 0.80)
• Interest groups do not amplify majority policy preferences; business groups dominate despite opposing them. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Expellee groups could veto policy options but not shape policy positively #complicates (0.82) — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 178
• Business dominance stems from group numbers, not greater per-group influence. #complicates (0.78) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 124