Simple discrete salient limits enable coordinated expectations.

Evidence

My argument is that there are particular limits—simple, discrete, qualitative, “obvious” limits—that are conducive to a concerted choice; those who specify other kinds of limits, I predict, can find few partners or none at all whose limits coincide with theirs. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 602

Categorization

• XREF: The salience prediction generalizes to any coordination without communication — a testable claim the reader can apply to enforcement norms. — connects to: Limits emerge through tacit jockeying and need unique focal qualities. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 600; Symbolic generalization absorbs uncertainty by forming expectations at the cost of situational flexibility.; Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201 (+7 more)

Related

• Limits emerge through tacit jockeying and need unique focal qualities. (similarity 0.85)
• Restrained competition everywhere favors discrete qualitative over graded limits (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations (similarity 0.81)
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations (similarity 0.81)
• Tacit limits require qualitative boundaries amenable to complete abstention (similarity 0.81)
• Bargaining outcomes rest on convergent reflexive expectations, not on force or merit (similarity 0.80)
• Tacit-bargaining theory guides where to seek terms, not their probability (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Symbolic generalization absorbs uncertainty by forming expectations at the cost of situational flexibility. #expands (0.85)
• Unilateral, non-reciprocal communication can coordinate both parties’ expectations #exemplifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 201
• Restrained competition everywhere favors discrete qualitative over graded limits #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 196
• Economic determination acts by setting limits rather than predicting specific outcomes #expands (0.85)
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations #corroborates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187
• Tacit and explicit bargaining form one continuum dependent on coordinated expectations #corroborates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 186
• Bargaining outcomes rest on convergent reflexive expectations, not on force or merit #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 177
• Tacit limits require qualitative boundaries amenable to complete abstention #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 194