Compellence works by creating shared uncontrollable risk of catastrophe
Evidence
What is the country doing? The principal thing the country is doing—in addition to damaging or humiliating Russia—is incurring a painful risk that both it and Russia (and the rest of the world) will be engaged in all-out war in the near future, a war that neither it nor Russia wants. The country is saying in effect, “If you do not get out of Hungary, we may cause an all-out war to occur.” By when must the Russians get out? The sooner they get out, the sooner the risk of war (from this cause) will be terminated or reduced. The country applying the pressure is not saying, “Get out or we shall deliberately start a war.” The decision is not up to them, and does not depend on their displaying the manifest resolution for a final act. The Russians may suppose that the country concerned will do everything it can to prevent total war; but they also have to recognize that with these things flying around, exploding now and then, and with themselves responding in whatever way they feel obliged to, it is not altogether clear that the country concerned, and the Russians, know how to keep total war from occurring. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 444
Categorization
- XREF: The mechanism — pressure imposes a risk both sides want to end, giving the other party a deadline tied to cumulative risk — maps to how Mafia threats carry a ticking clock that only compliance relieves. — connects to: A losing side rationally abandons containment for deliberate risk-creation. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 431; Brinkmanship is placing oneself on an uncontrolled slope of shared risk — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 448; Small-probability threats are superior to large certain threats in compellence — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 442 (+5 more)
Related
- Catastrophic stalemate can result from momentary dominance failure rather than organic crisis (similarity 0.79)
- Unforeseeable escalation risk alone can deter aggression even among cautious rational actors. (similarity 0.79)
- A losing side rationally abandons containment for deliberate risk-creation. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Deterrent threats can be passive but compellent threats require commitment
#expands(0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 438 - Mutual fear can amplify exogenously into runaway escalation via feedback loops.
#expands(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 485