Fear of surprise attack produces all-or-none outcomes, not probability multiplication.

Evidence

But we do not. We do not get any regular kind of “multiplier” effect out of this. The probabilities of attack by the two sides do not interact to yield a higher probability, except when they yield certainty. That is, the outcome of this game, starting with finite probabilities of “irrational” attack on both sides, is not an enlargement of those probabilities by the fear of surprise attack; it is either joint attack or no attack. That is, it is a pair of decisions, not a pair of probabilities about behavior. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 472

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the reader’s Milgrom/Gambetta framework: the all-or-none decision framing contrasts with probabilistic deterrence assumptions. — connects to: Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491; Small first-strike temptations can compound into attack through interacting expectations alone — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 462

Related

• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking (similarity 0.89)
• Small first-strike temptations can compound into attack through interacting expectations alone (similarity 0.86)
• Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.82)
• Preclusive self-defense can itself provoke the attack it tries to avert (similarity 0.80)
• Mutual fear can amplify exogenously into runaway escalation via feedback loops. (similarity 0.79)
• Small-probability threats are superior to large certain threats in compellence (similarity 0.79)
• Rational actors need not calculate beyond first-order attack likelihoods. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Fear of surprise attack feeds back into raising each side’s own probability of attacking #complicates (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 491
• Small first-strike temptations can compound into attack through interacting expectations alone #complicates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 462