Rational self-defense adjustments are compatible with both sides still preferring mutual non-attack

Evidence

Since f′ is presumed positive, the denominator must be positive if Vr is to be maximized with R < 1; but the condition that the denominator be positive is precisely the condition that Pc must meet in order that player R still prefer joint no-attack. Thus, if both players have optimal adjustments with R < 1, those optimal values of R and B are also perforce consistent with joint preference at no-attack. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 504

Categorization

• XREF: Relevant to the reader’s arbitration/no-attack stability question: optimal defensive precaution does not itself overturn the jointly-preferred cooperative outcome under parametric adjustment. — connects to: Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 529; Adversaries may gain by buying each other’s defensive capacity — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 818; Stability of mutual-deterrence equilibria depends on the slopes of each side’s response functions — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 502 (+2 more)

Related

• Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. (similarity 0.84)
• Stability of mutual-deterrence equilibria depends on the slopes of each side’s response functions (similarity 0.83)

Broader Connections

• Stability of mutual-deterrence equilibria depends on the slopes of each side’s response functions #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 502
• Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. #corroborates (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 529
• Adversaries may gain by buying each other’s defensive capacity #exemplifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 818
• Deterrence requires mixed conflict and common interest between parties #expands (0.74) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 33