Deterrence requires mixed conflict and common interest between parties
Evidence
The deterrence concept requires that there be both conflict and common interest between the parties involved; it is as inapplicable to a situation of pure and complete antagonism of interest as it is to the case of pure and complete common interest. Between these extremes, deterring an ally and deterring an enemy differ only by degrees, and in fact we may have to develop a more coherent theory before we can even say in a meaningful way whether we have more in common with Russia or with Greece, relative to the conflicts between us. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 33
Categorization
- XREF: The mixed-motive requirement maps to Milgrom et al.’s private-judge framework, where parties have both conflict and gains-from-trade needing third-party enforcement. — connects to: Rational self-defense adjustments are compatible with both sides still preferring mutual non-attack — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 504; Mutual nuclear deterrence is a modern form of hostage exchange. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 545; Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202 (+1 more)
- DEFINE: Defines the necessary scope condition for deterrence — neither pure antagonism nor pure harmony qualifies.
Related
- Game theory clarifies deterrence problems but remains too abstract to apply directly (similarity 0.82)
- Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. (similarity 0.81)
- Mutual nuclear deterrence is a modern form of hostage exchange. (similarity 0.81)
- A perfectly stable balance of deterrence may not even be desirable, let alone achievable. (similarity 0.81)
- Conflict settings share common-interest structures across wildly different scales (similarity 0.80)
- Deterrence operates on graduated probability, not a binary trip-wire logic (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Threats require commitment, not comparative damage to both parties
#contradicts(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 296 - Game theory succeeds on pure conflict but fails on mixed conflict-cooperation
#expands(0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202