Judging mutual invulnerability requires comparing two distinct deterrent threats

Evidence

While the threat of all-out punishment may lose credibility with the achievement of invulnerability by both sides’ retaliatory forces, the threat of limited retaliation may well gain it. Whatever the net effect, we cannot deprecate a world of invulnerable SAC’s simply by reference to the need for third-area deterrence; it has to be demonstrated that one particular deterrent threat (the massive one) is more potent than the other (limited) one. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 587

Categorization

• XREF: This forces an analytical comparison of threat types rather than assuming the massive one dominates — a move the reader could apply to evaluating which enforcement mechanism a Godfather offers versus state courts. — connects to: Both rivals seek a detection advantage while hoping none is found — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 543; Mutually invulnerable retaliation forces neutralize each other’s deterrent role — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 582; Mutual invulnerability raises the credibility of limited retaliation — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 585 (+5 more)

Related

• Mutually invulnerable retaliation forces neutralize each other’s deterrent role (similarity 0.88)
• Mutual invulnerability raises the credibility of limited retaliation (similarity 0.84)
• Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. (similarity 0.83)
• Deterrence rests on surviving retaliation capacity, not on existing destructive capacity. (similarity 0.83)
• Invulnerability in strategic argument is often proxied by undetectability (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Stability of mutual-deterrence equilibria depends on the slopes of each side’s response functions #expands (0.82) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 502
• Invulnerability in strategic argument is often proxied by undetectability #qualifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 837
• Known capability for failure can stabilize mutual-threat situations #complicates (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 822
• Any attempt to achieve invulnerability engenders a corresponding vulnerability. #complicates (0.75) — Grégoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, 291
• Attempts to achieve invulnerability always engender a corresponding vulnerability #complicates (0.75)