Known capability for failure can stabilize mutual-threat situations
Evidence
There is an important asymmetry in the problem as formulated here. We have allowed for the possibility that one may shoot when he shouldn’t and the other knows it—the “nervousness” case—but not for the possibility that one may not shoot when he ought to, and the other knows it. (There may be some chance that the burglar has wet ammunition or forgot to load his gun, and I may know that there is such a chance, he may know that I know it, and so forth.) This possibility would apparently be stabilizing, tending to reduce the likelihood of a decision to attack as well as the exogenous likelihood of inadvertent or irrational attack. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 822
Categorization
- DEEPTHINKING: The asymmetry — credibly being unable to act wrongly is stabilizing — is a genuinely dense point worth sitting with.
- XREF: The weaponized-vulnerability logic connects to the reader’s hostage-mechanics frame: being known-incapable becomes a commitment device. — connects to: Mutual fear can amplify exogenously into runaway escalation via feedback loops. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 485; Judging mutual invulnerability requires comparing two distinct deterrent threats — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 587; Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 783 (+2 more)
Related
- Mutual deterrence depends on balance stability, not on sheer symmetry. (similarity 0.82)
- Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.79)
Broader Connections
- Threats, promises, and commitments unify as payoff-restricting reaction functions
#expands(0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 783